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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U ta.h 
GERTRUDE GIBBS, LYNN P. 
GIBBS and GA YE GIBBS SMITH, 
Plaintiffs a.nd Appellants, 
-vs.-
BLUE CAB, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Civil No. 7710 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court of 
the State of Utah 
Honorable Charles G. Cowley, Judge 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the morning of the 24th day of November, 1948, 
about 6 :40 A.M., one of the defendant's taxicabs driven 
by one Ronald D. Mullen, its agent, was proceeding 
easterly on 23rd Street in Ogden, Utah, at a rate of speed 
between 20 and 25 miles per hour ( TR-55). The street 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was dmnp and the morning was dark and rainy (TR-55). 
As the taxicah came to the intersection of 23rd Street and 
Jefferson Avenue the driver, Ronald D. lVIullen, observed 
the front wheel of a bicycle in his lef~ front headlight 
approximately ten to fifteen feet ahead of the taxicab 
( TR-55, 56). r_rhe taxicab struck the bicycle and one F. 
Parley Gibbs in the southwest quadrant of the intersec-
tion, and the bicycle and taxicab came to rest easterly 
of the area of impact (Stipulated,Diagram). The inter-
section was lighted on the north-east corner by a street 
lmnp (Stipulated Diagram). After the i:r~pact F. Parley 
Gibbs, wheeled his bicycle northward on Jefferson Ave-
nue (TR-52). The taxicab then proceeded one-half block 
east on 23rd Street and picked up a passenger (TR-58). 
The taxi-driver then and there admitted to the passenger 
that he did not see l\Ir. Gibbs until he hit him, and that 
his vision was obscured (TR-7). 
F. Parley Gibbs died as a result of this collision. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record as to the 
deceased's conduct prior to the collision in question. 
There is no evidence in the record regarding which direc-
tion the deceased was moving prior to the impact, or 
whether he was riding his bicycle or merely pushing it 
or standing still in the intersection. 
The only heirs of F. Parley Gibbs brought this ac-
tion against the defendant to recover damages for his 
wrongful death. The case was tried before a jury, and 
the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant 
against the plaintiffs upon the ground that deceased 
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was contributorily negligent as a nmtter of law in failing 
to keep a proper lookout prior to the collision (TR-89, 
90). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VER-
DICT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS UPON THE GROUND THAT 
DECEASED WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, IN THAT DECEASED WAS PRESUMED 
TO HAVE BEEN ACTING WITH DUE CARE, AND SAID 
PRESUMPTION WAS NOT OVERCOME. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VER-
DICT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS UPON -THE GROUND THAT 
DECEASED WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, IN THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A 
VERDICT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS UPON THE GROUND 
THAT DECEASED WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, AS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER 
OR NO DECEASED'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, IF 
ANY, PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH 
WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT FOR THE JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VER-
DICT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS UPON THE GROUND THAT 
DECEASED \VAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, IN THAT DECEASED WAS PRESUMED 
TO H~ VE BEEN ACTING WITH DUE CARE, AND SAID 
PRESUMPTION WAS NOT OVERCOME. 
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The question to be detennined in deciding this point 
rs: Vvas there sufficient evidence introduced to show 
decedent was contributorily negligent ati a matter of law? 
Let us review such evidence as shown by the record. 
The only testimony regarding decedent's conduct 
was given by the driver of respondent's vehicle. His 
testimony was that decedent's bike was first seen in 
his left front headlight (TR-55 and 61) son1e 10 feet to 
15 feet away ('rR-60), and that at no time did he see the 
decedent prior to hiting hirn ('~rR-58), and that the front 
wheel of the bike was turned in a southeasterly direction 
(TR-62) or very nearly parallel to respondent's vehicle 
(TR-62). rrhis testimony of respondent's agent, along 
with the physical evidence (Stipulated Diagram) are all 
that the Court can consider in overcoming the presump-
tion of due care. It should be noted that there is no 
evidence showing what the decedent was doing at the time 
of impact; whether he was mounted upon his bike or 
afoot; whether he was stopped or rnoving in a forward 
direction. 
Therefore, we must ask ourselves: Is the testimony 
that the front wheel of a bike is seen and struck in the 
center of an intersection sufficient evidence to over-
come the presumption of due cure to which the decedent 
was entitled and hold that he was negligent as a matter 
of law? It is the contention of the appellant that this is 
not sufficient evidence to overcon1e such presumption 
and the following cases are cited in support of such con-
6 
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tention. In the recent ease of Jfingus v. Ollson, (Utah-
1949), 201 Pac. :!nd 495, the decedent, a pedestrian, was 
killed while crossing 13th East Street on Westminster 
~\venue in Salt Lake City at night-thne. The Court ruled 
that the presun1ption of due care was overcome because 
of concrete testi1nony by the decedent's wife, who was 
walking with hhn when he was struck, to the effect that 
decedent failed to look in any direction before stepping 
into the street. The concurring opinion says: (Page 499) 
"Of course, if there was a complete absence 
of evidence as to whether he took any precautions 
to avoid the accident, then the law creates a pre-
sumption that he took reasonable precautions for 
his own safety and that he was injured in spite 
of such precautions . 
.. But here there was evidence from which the 
jury could reasonably find that he took no pre-
caution for his own safety, and on the production 
of such evidence the presumption disappears from 
the case and the question must be determined frmn 
the evidence. Of course the facts upon which the 
presu'mption is based are still in evidence and if 
they have a logical tendency to prove that the 
decedent used reasonable care for his own safety, 
they may be considered in determining the ques-
tion." (Italics added). 
In another recent decision, Compton et al v. Ogden 
Union Ry. & Depot Company, (Utah-1951), 235 Pac. 2nd 
515, the decedent was killed when struck by defendant's 
engine in its yard at Ogden, Utah. The trial court entered 
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judgment of dismissal at conclusion of plaintiff's case. 
In this case, decedent was walking with a con1panion who 
accounted for all her rnovements immediately prior to, 
and at the time she was struck. 
The court in its opinion said that there is a strong 
presun1ption based on the instinct of self-preservation 
that the deceased was exercising due care for her own 
safety and which may take the place of evidence sufficient 
to make findings on, in the absence of other evidence. 
It then goes on to say: 
"The presun1ption is applicable where there 
is no evidence as to care used, or perhaps where 
the evidence comes frmn an adverse witness who 
may be subject to disbelief by the jury, or where 
there is sufficient uncertainty in the evidence as to 
cast doubt on the testimony." 
There are several Utah cases sustaining instructions 
that the presun1ption nmst he considered by the jun, in 
cases where no witnesses have seen the mishap and physi-
cal evidence alone must be relied upon by defendants 
to sustain a finding hy the jury of contributory negli-
gence. 
In Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 40 Utah 
483, 1:23 Pac. 97, decedent was killed at night at defend-
ant's crossing. No eye witnesses of the accident testified, 
and the body was found at the side of defendant's tracks 
on the morning following the mishap. Decedent was walk-
8 
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ing when killed, and it was ad1nitted by plaintiff that the 
train could have been seen son1e 200 to 250 feet frmn the 
crossing. An instruction was given and sustained that it 
must be presumed that deceased used due care. The 
court states : 
"The hnportant question is: does the evi-
dence when viewed in the light most favorable 
to respondents, overcome this legal presumption 
of ordinary care on the part of Lewis 1 We think 
not." 
See also Coray v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 111 
Utah, 541, 180 Pac. 2nd 542, which is a similar case in 
which a switch1nan was killed while on duty and his body 
later found lying near the tracks. See also Davis v. Den-
uer & Rio Grande Western Railway Co., 45 Utah 17, 142 
Pac. 705, a case in which the deceased was hit by defend-
ant's train and no witnesses testified regarding the facts 
surrounding the mishap. The court in this case gave the 
following instructions and it was held proper upon ap-
peal: 
"There is a presun1ption of law that every 
1nan exercises due care for his own safety when 
in a place of danger and that deceased did so at 
the time and place when and where he met death, 
so that plaintiff was not required to prove affirma-
tively that deceased looked and listened for the 
train, the presumption being that he did so, and 
burden on defendant to prove otherwise, which 
was bound to establish that fact by a preponder-
ence of the evidence." 
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In Evans v. Oregon Shortline Ry. Co., 37 Utah 4/31, 
108 Pac. 638, decedent was killed while crossing defend-
ant's tracks with tean1 and wagon. The court upon ap-
peal held: 
"It is a presumption of law that every man 
exercise due care for his own safety when in a 
place of danger, and the presumption is that de-
ceased did so when he approached the crossing." 
In Clark et al v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 70 Utah 29, 
257 Pac. 1050, the lower court directed a verdict for de-
fendant, plaintiffs appealed and the trial court was re-
versed. Plaintiff brought action to recover for wrongful 
death resulting frmn a collision at a public crossing. 
There was considerable variance in the testimony of wit-
nesses regarding warnings given by defendant. How-
ever, it was determined that visibility was relatively 
poor, and a fireman testified he saw decedent's truck 
some 125 feet from the crossing; that he supposed that 
the driver would stop and let the train go by, but that he 
failed to do so and was struck. The court states : 
"The burden of proving contributory negli-
gence, of course, was on the defendant. In absence 
of evidence, there is a presumption that the de-
ceased looked and listened, and did all that pru-
dence and due care required ... 
"The question thus is, does the record conclu-
sively show that deceased failed to look and listen, 
and that by looking and listening he could have 
discovered the approach of the train in time to 
have stopped and let it pass f' 
10 
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The court considering the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiffs found the question of contri-
butory negligence to be for the jury and remanded for 
rehearing. 
In Baker v. Savos et al, 52 Utah 262, 
172 Pac. Pac. 6'7.:2, a child was killed on Redwood Road 
near Taylorsville by an overtaking nwtor truck. No wit-
nesses were found and the defendant denied knowledge 
of hitting the child. However, the jury basing their deci-
sion upon circun1stantial ·evidence found for plaintiff, 
and in so doing considered the presmnption of due care 
as to the dead child. 
There are nurnerous cases in other jurisdictions deal-
ing with this point and the following are leading Cali-
fornia decisions. 
In Wright v. Sniffin et al, 80 Cal. App. (2d) 358, 181 
Pac. 2nd 675, plaintiff's daughter was killed on a bi-
cycle as she turned left into defendant's vehicle without 
signaling. The court held: 
"In spite of the evidence of the defendants 
that N onna failed to give left arm signal or any 
warning of her intention to cross the highway, 
plaintiff was entitled to the presumption that the 
deceased used due care for her own safety. . . . 
which created a conflict of evidence regarding 
that subject." 
Rios v. Bennett, 88 Cal. App. (2d) 919, 200 Pac. 2nd 
73, is a case in which decedent was killed by defendant's 
11 
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vehicle at night as he walked diagonally across the street 
out of the pedestrian lane. Witness testified that de-
ceased walked into the path of defendant's vehicle which 
witness had seen some 70 to 7;) feet away. rrhe court held 
that: 
"A presumption existed that a pedestrian 
struck. ... by an autornobile used ordinary care 
for his own safety and that in doing so he looked 
before he stepped out into the street." 
The case of Blackm,ore v. Brennan, 43 Cal. App. (2d) 
280, 110 Pac. 2nd 723, is another California case of 
wrongful death of a rnotorist in an open intersection. 
The court in this case said : 
"In the absence of evidence overcoming the 
presumption it should prevail ... In other words 
the jury was told in effect that it must determine 
whether sufficient evidence had been adduced to 
overcome that presumption." 
Duehren v. Stewart, 39 Cal. App. 201, 102 Pac. 2nd 
784, is a case in which decedent, a pedestrian, was killed 
while crossing in a crosswalk at an intersection. The 
mishap occurred at 8 :00 P.:M. Witnesses testified that 
decedent walked "pretty fast" and "didn't turn his head 
or look in the direction from which they were approach-
ing." The lower court instructed the jury regarding the 
presurnption of due care and appellant complained that 
it was error to give such instruction since 
12 
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"Actions of deceased at tilne of accident were 
seen and mnounted to contributory negligence as 
a matter of law ... that they have (speaking of the 
instruc'tions) no place in the record when evidence 
clearly demonstrates the action of injured or de~ 
ceased party. 
"It is contended that there is no conflict in 
the evidence as to the actions of the deceased frorn 
the time he was first observed on the sidewalk 
until he was struck; that he stepped down into the 
street and walked across the same at a moderate 
gait and at no time turned his head to look in the 
direction in which oncoming traffic might endan-
ger his safety; that the appellate courts have held 
that 'to look and fail to see' what is perfectly ob-
vious and apparent is negligence; that Mr. Watt 
testified that he saw the deceased on the sidewalk 
before he stepped into the street; that he saw him 
step into the street and that he was looking 
straight ahead at all times and walking at a 
moderate gait; that where all the facts and cir-
cumstances were proven, the court was not author-
ized to cast a presmnption into the scales in favor 
of the plaintiff. 
"Appellant does not argue that the evidence 
does not establish appellant's negligence. The 
law gave to the deceased the right of way in a 
marked crosswalk. The appellant not only drove 
at an excessive rate of speed but passed another 
car at the intersection under circumstances where 
he could not have seen whether there were pedes-
trians in the crosswalk or not. That he was not 
keeping an accurate or sufficient lookout is con-
clusively demonstrated by his statement. No wit-
ness testifying on behalf of the respondents saw 
~fr. Duerhan at all as he approached Hill Street, 
13 
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nor did any of respondent's witnesses observe him 
until he was first seen by l\frs. 'N att some 10 or 
15 feet out into the cros~\valk. The presumption 
therefore, arose in the absence of evidence on the 
subject. There is therefore nothing to call that 
presumption to the ath~ntion of the jury unless the 
court did instruct them relative to its existence. 
"It has been repeatedly held that disputable 
presumptions are evidence in a case ... , and such 
presumption 1nay be controverted by other evi-
dence .... It has also been repeatedly held that it 
is a question for the jury to determine whether the 
presumption has been overcome by evidence of-
fered in contradiction thereof .... Respondents 
produced no evidence to determine what observa-
tions :Mr. Duehren n1ade just before he attempted 
to cross the street. Appellant offered no evidence 
as to whether the deceased looked prior to the 
time he stepped off the curb,. (Italics by court). 
Respondents were therefore entitled to the pre-
sumption above mentioned as their own evidence 
was reconcilable with it, and such presumption re-
Inained as evidence in the case until dispelled by 
evidence offered in contradiction thereof." 
In Greenslitt v. Three Brothers Banking Company, 
170 Ore. 345, 133 Pac. 2nd 597, decedent was struck by 
defendant's vehicle in daylight when decedent ran diago-
nally across a highway into the path of a truck. The court 
held: 
"The evidence tending to show negligence on 
his part is not of such conclusive character as to 
overcon1e such presurnption as a matter of law. 
The issue of contributory negligence was properly 
submitted to the jury." 
14 
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The case of Wiswell v. Shinners, 47 Cal. App. (2d) 
156, 117 Pac. 2·nd 677, deals with a pedestrian versus a 
motorist. In this case the pedestrian was struck and 
killed and there was evidence that he was not in a cross-
walk when the accident occurred. At page 680, the Court 
says: 
"In urging that the direct evidence furnished 
by an eye-witness in this case dissipated the pre-
smnptions established by law, respondents fail to 
appreciate the limitations upon the power of the 
trial court when directing a· verdict as such limit-
ations are laid down in Estate of Flood and Estate 
of Lances, supra. Under the familiar rules there 
enunciated, when there is a showing on behalf of 
the plaintiff of certain facts as in the instant case, 
certain physical facts, such as skid marks and 
their relation to the point of collision and the point 
at which the driver first applied his brakes; the 
speed of the automobile; the failure of the driver 
to sound his horn or otherwise give warning; the 
unobstructed view of deceased on the part of the 
driver for some considerable distance; the clear-
ness of the weather and the dryness of the street, 
together with the presumptions relied upon; and 
when on the other hand, evidence both direct and 
circumstantial, favorable to their cause, is intro-
duced by defendants, the latter evidence must be 
eliminated from consideration by the court for the 
purpose of ruling upon a motion for a directed 
verdict. 
"We therefore conclude that appellant was en-
titled to the benefit of the presumptions here 
claimed until dispelled by evidence opposed to 
the1n, and that it was for the jury to determine 
whether the presumptions had been overcome 
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by evidence offered in con traction thereof, and 
which last-named evidence the court was not per-
mitted to consider in ruling upon the motion for 
a directed verdict. 
"Cases cited by respondents in support of 
their clain1 that the presumption is destroyed by 
evidenee in contradietion thereof are all cases 
where appeals were taken from final judgments, 
in the rendition of which the court or jury was 
entitled to pass upon the weight of all the evi-
dence submitted and to judge of the credibility 
of witnesses. Such power js not within the prov-
ince of a court in ruling upon motions for non-suit 
or directed verdict." 
It will be noted that in many of the cases cited here--
In actual eye-witnesses testified regarding conduct of 
deceased which, if proven true, would definitely establish 
contributory negligence. However, even under these cir-
cumstances the court entertains tha presumption and 
allows the jury to determine if the evidence has been 
sufficient to overcome it. In the case at hand there is no 
evidence regarding decedent's actions and it is mere con-
jecture that he failed to stop or that he failed to see what 
he should have seen. For this reason the court erred in 
directing a verdict for the defendant. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING AVER-
DICT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS UPON THE GROUND THAT 
DECEASED WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, IN THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY. 
Even assuming that had Mr. Gibbs looked he would 
have seen the approaching taxicab, it is strongly urged 
16 
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Ly appellants that the question of the deceased's contri-
butory negligence is one of fact and not one of law. The 
most recent Utal1 pronouncement upon this problen1 ap-
pears to be contained within the case entitled Lowder v. 
Holley (Utah-1951) :233 Pac. 2nd 350. In that case the 
plaintiff and defendant collided in an open intersection 
during the daytiiue. The negligence of the defendant 
was clear but there 'vas mnple evidence that had the 
plaintiff looked he would have seen the defendant and 
hence he was contributorily negligent. The court stated 
that it is true : 
"That before entering an intersection the 
driver of a car must look and determine whether 
it is safe to enter. However, had plaintiff ob-
served the truck (defendant's) just before he en-
tered the intersection he would have been justified 
in considering it safe to enter because at that point 
the truck was being driven at the rate of fifty 
Iniles per hour and plaintiff was driving at from 
five to ten miles per hour ... then the truck would 
have been at least 250 feet from the intersection 
since his car had traveled almost the entire dis-
tance across the intersection before the impact, 
and this being so, he could have assumed and acted 
under the assu1nption that the driver of the truck 
would exercise ordinary and reasonable care in 
his driving and that it would be safe to cross the 
intersection. Had defendant exercised such rea-
sonable and ordinary care, the collision would not 
have occurred. Under such state of facts plain-
tiff's failure to see the truck would in no way have 
contributed to the accident. The Court therefore 
did not err in finding that plaintiff was not con-
tributorily negligent." 
17 
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It is urged in the case herein that had deceased ob-
served defendant's taxicab, because of the great disparity 
in speed between these two vehicle~, he woul~ have been 
justified in considering it safe to enter the intersection. 
In any event the Lowder ca~e states that whether or no 
he acted as a reasonable nmn in entering the intersection 
after having seen the approaching danger was a question 
within the province of the jury. This is so even though 
the only reasonable inference to be drawn from all of 
the evidence is that had plaintiff looked he would have 
seen. 
The case at bar however is even stronger than the 
Lowder case as several inferences regarding lookout 
1night reasonably have been drawn hy the jury from all 
the evidence. It might well have been inferred that de-
ceased looked and could not see, or that he saw and, as a 
reasonable man, misjudged the danger. The trial court 
therefore comn1itted error in taking this vital factual 
issue from the determination of the jury. 
The general doctrine of the Lowder case is rean-
nounced in a more recent Utah case, Compton v. Ogden 
Union Railway Co., (Supra): 
"Only in a clear case, where all reasonable 
1ninds agree, should the issue of contributory 
negligence be taken fron1 the jury." 
The doctrine of the Lowder case is not novel to 
Utah. It was earlier announced in the following cases: 
Spackman v. Carson, (Utah-1950) 216 Pac. 2nd 640, 
Nielson v. Manchley (Utah-194.9) 202 Pac. 2nd 547, Hun-
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ter v. Jlichaelis (Utah-1948) 198 Pac .. 2nd 245, and Martin 
v. Sheffield, 11.2 Uta.h 478, 189 Pac. 2nd 1.'!7. 
It is true that the fact situation in n1ost of the above 
cases are not identical with the Lowder case or the case 
before this court. However, in the forgotten case of 
Jlartin v. Sheffield, (Supt·a), which opinion has ap-
parently not been cited since, the fact situation was 
very close to the case before this Court. There was an 
additional eleinent of contributory negligence evidenced 
in that there was testiinony that the plaintiff did not look 
at all upon entering the intersection. Nevertheless, the 
unaniinous court held that the question of contributory 
negligence is a jury problem. 
In the case of Hunter v. Michaelis (Supra), a pedes-
trian was struck while crossing Wilshire Boulevard in 
Los Angeles, California, in the night-time. Though it is 
true the Utah Supreme Court applied California substan-
tive law in deciding this case, it nevertheless held that 
there was no contributory negligence as a matter of law 
for the pedestrian's failure to see. 
It appears that the rule of law announced in the 
Lowder case is also the rule of law in Colorado, Kansas, 
California, New lliexico, Oregon, Washington, Idaho and 
Montana. 
In the case of Lawrence v. Kansas City Power & 
Light Co., et al, 167 Kan. 4.5, 204 Pac. 2nd 752, 
the plaintiff and defendant collided in an open intersec-
tion, after the plaintiff had pre-empted the intersection. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas stated: 
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"Before a court can rule as a matter of law 
that negligence has been established, the evidence 
should be so clear that reasonable minds could 
have but one opinion, nan1ely: that the party was 
negligent. r_rhe question whether the auto driver 
was contributorily negligent in proceeding across 
the intersection after seeing the bus was· for the 
jury, and the jury might well have found the acts 
of the defendant to be the proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injury-i.e.-defendant not watching 
enough to know whether plaintiff was in the inter-
section." 
This opinion was rendered by the Kansas Supreme Court 
after the trial court had directed a verdict for the defend-
ant upon the ground that plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law. 
In the case of JJfartin v. Harrison, 182 Ore. 121, 186 
Pac. 2nd 534, the plaintiff, a pedestrian, was killed while 
crossing a highway, not at a crosswalk. The Supreme 
Court of Oregon stated: 
"Contributory negligence becomes a question 
of law only when frmu the facts reasonable men 
can draw only one inference and that inference 
points unerringly to negligence of plaintiff con- I_ 
tributing to the injury, and in other cases the 
question of contributory negligence is one of fact j 
for the jury. If a pedestrian crossing a street fail~ 
to look or looks straight ahead without glanc-
ing to either side ... he is guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law, but if he looks but 
does not see approaching automobiles, or seeing 
one, erroneously misjudges its speed or distance, 
or for some other reason assumes he could avoid 
injury to himself the question of contributory 
negligence is for the jury." 
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In the case of Prentis v. Joh1u-don, 119 Colo. 370, .203 
Pac. :.!·nd 733, the plaintiff and defendant collided in an 
open intersection and the Supren1e Court of Colorado 
said: 
"There is no contributory negligence as a 
matter of law for failure to exercise due care be-
cause the plaintiff looked to the right and failed to 
see, but the question of contributory negligence 
is for the jury." 
In the case of Stickel v. San Diego Electric Co. et 
al, 32 Cal. (2d) 157, 195 Pac. 2nd 416, the plaintiff and 
defendant collided in an intersection after the plaintiff 
pulled into the intersection fron1 a stop sign. Th~ Court 
held: 
"The evidence was insufficient to establish as 
a 1natter of law that plaintiff negligently failed to 
yield the right of way and that such negligence 
contributed to the collision. The jury could have 
decided that when defendant started across the 
intersection she reasonably believed that the bus 
was not an immediate hazard." 
In the case of Schoen v. Schroeder, 53 N. M. 1, 200 
Pac. 2nd 1021, plaintiff and defendant collided in an 
intersection after plaintiff had preempted. Held: 
"The mere fact that plaintiff motorist drove 
into the intersection from the left when defendant 
was traveling down the street at some undisclosed 
point on his right, did not establish as a tnatter 
of law that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence, although plaintiff did not see defend-
ant when he looked in his direction." 
In the case of Rios v. Bennett, (Supra), a 
pedestrian was struck and killed at night while crossing 
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a highway, though there was no evidence of whether 
the pedestrian looked before stepping onto the highway. 
The California Court stated: 
"Whether a mistake in judgment by a pedes-
trian when crossing a street, as to speed and dan-
ger of approaching vehicles, constitutes contribu-
tory negligence is a question for the jury. As 
there was no evidence whether the pedestrian 
looked or not a presumption existed that he used 
ordinary care for his own safety and that in doing 
so he looked before he stepped out into the street/' 
In the case of Warren v. Hynes, 4 Wash. (2d) 128, 
102 Pac. 2nd 691, plaintiff had crossed the center Ilne of 
an intersection after looking and not seeing and was 
struck by the defendant approaching the intersection 
at a ninety degree angle. The "\Vashington Court held: 
"Whether plaintiff who looked to the left 
when he was between 150 and 180 feet from the 
intersection, saw no approaching auto, and did not 
again look in that direction until his auto was in 
the center of the intersection, was contributorily 
negligent was for the jury." 
In Wiswell v. Shinners, (Supra), the Court con-
cludes: 
"On the record presented to us herein, we feel 
that the question whether decedent's behavior 
and conduct, that is to say, whether he looked 
and either did not see the approaching automobile, 
or saw it and misjudged either its speed or dis-
tance, constituted contributory negligence under 
the particular circumstances then existing, was 
one of fact, as was also the question of whether 
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decedent's conduct 1neasured up to the require-
ments of that of a reasonable man in complying 
with the aforesaid Vehicle Code provision. The 
question of contributory negligence is always one 
of fact for the jury to decide under proper instruc-
tions, except in those cases in which, judged in 
the light of con1mon knowledge and experience, 
there is a standard of prudence to which all per-
sons silnilarly situated must confonn. It is only 
in these last-nan1ed cases that failure to adhere 
to that conunon standard is as a n1atter of law 
contributory negligence. Where different con-
clusions n1ay reasonably be drawn by different 
minds fron1 the same evidence, the decision must 
be left to the triers of fact. Therefore, under the 
facts and circumstances here present, the ques-
tions of the negligence of the defendant and the 
contributory negligence of the deceased, as well 
as the important question of proximate cause, 
were all for the jury to determine in the light of 
all the facts, circumstances and presumptions pre-
sented by the evidence. 
"It should be understood that throughout this 
opinion we have followed the rule applicable to 
cases where the appeal is taken from a judgment 
following a directed verdict or non-suit, which rule 
requires that evidence, and presumptions as a 
species of evidence, shall be taken by the appellate 
tribunal in the light most favorable to the losing 
party in the court below. We are therefore ex-
pressing no opinion as to the weight of the evi-
dence or its truth or falsity." 
In the case entitled Flynn v. Helena Cab & Bus Co., 
94 Mont. 204, 21 Pac. 2nd 1105, plaintiff proceeding at 
12 miles per hour, saw defendant, proceeding at 40 miles 
per hour some distance fron1 intersection, but neverthe-
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less entered the intersection and was struck. The court 
stated: 
"Plaintiff seeing defendant, approaching 
street intersection fron1 right, travel 150 ft. while 
plaintiff went 40 feet not contributorily negligent 
as a nmtter of law in proceeding forward when 
defendant was 150ft. away." 
See also Maier et al v. 1lfinidoka County Motor Co., 
et al61 Ida. 642,105 Pac. 2nd 1076. 
It should be noted that many of the above cases in-
volved fact situations wherein there was considerable 
evidence of plaintiff's failure to exercise due care in his 
own behalf. In the case at bar, however, the sole factual 
basis of the legal deter1nination of decedent's contribu-
tory negligence was the inference from the physical 
facts that had he looked he would have seen the appro_ach-
ing taxicab. 
It is respectfully urged, therefore, by virtue of the 
above authority, that the trial court committed error. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A 
VERDICT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS UPON THE GROUND 
THAT DECEASED WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, AS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER 
OR NO DECEASED'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, IF 
ANY, PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH 
WAS AN ISSUE OFF ACT FOR THE JURY. 
It is appellants' futher contention that, under the 
facts of this case, the proximate cause of the death of F. 
Parley Gibbs was a question for the jury and that it con-
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stituted error for the trial court to direct a verdict 
against the plaintiffs. 
In the case of Greenfield v. Br·uskas, 41 N. M. 346, 
68 Pac. 2nd 921 at page 926, proxin1ate cause was defined 
as follows: 
"Proximate cause is an ultimate fact and is 
usually an inference to be drawn by the jury from 
the facts proved, and only becomes a question of 
law when the facts regarding causation are undis-
puted and all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn therefrmn are plain, consistent and un-
contradictory." 
The leading case in Utah dealing with causation is 
that of Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 Pac. 2nd 510, 
and in that case the trial court held that both the plaintiff 
and the defendant were negligent as a Inatter of law but 
submitted to the jury the question of proximate cause. 
A verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed on appeal. The 
dissenting opinion in the case of Hickock v. Skinner, 113 
Utah 1, 190Pac. 2nd 514, said the following with respect 
to Hess v. Robinson : 
"Even if it be conceded that plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law, the ques-
tion of whether or not such negligence was a sub-
stantial causative factor in producing the collision 
was one of fact. Even if plaintiff had taken a 
second or third look, such might not have revealed 
to him that defendant would not yield the right-of-
way to hiin, until too late for plaintiff to avert the 
accident. This case is somewhat similar to Hess 
v. Robinson. In that case plaintiff was driving 
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on a through highwa~· and did not see defendant'~ 
ambulance approaching from the right. The am-
bulance went through the stop sign and crashed 
into plaintiff's autmnobile. The trial court held 
both parties negligent as a matter of law, but sub-
mitted the case to the jury on the question of 
whether or not plaintiff's contributory negligence 
was a proximate cause of the damage. From a 
verdict and judgment for plajntiff, defendants 
appealed. We affirmed. Although this court di-
vided on the question of whether or not plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law, we agreed unanimously that the question 
of proximate cause was one for the jury. I recog-
nize that the facts of this case are somewhat dif-
ferent frmn those in the Hess case, but the under-
lying reasoning should be the same. 
In the case of Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey, 61 Utah 
465, 214 Pac. 304, the trial court refused to give the fol-
lowing instructions as requested by the plaintiff: 
"You are instructed that it is negligence as a 
matter of law for a person to drive an automobile 
upon a traveled public highway, used by vehicles 
and pedestrians, at such a rate of speed that said 
automobile cannot be stopped within the distance 
at which the operator of said car is able to see ob-
jects on the highway in front of him." 
This refusal was held error on appeal. However, in 
the recent case of Wright v. 111aynard (Utah-1951), :235 
Pac. 2nd 916, the validity of the foregoing rule of law 
was affinned but it was held that the question of proxi-
mate cause was a question for the jury. 
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In the case of Styris v. Folk, 62 Nev. 209, 146 Pac. 
2-nd 782, the plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck by the 
defendant, a 1notorist, while crossing the street in the 
middle of the block in violation of a city ordinance. The 
Court at page 786 of the Pacific Reporter says: 
"Appellant's contention that the continual 
negligence rule should apply because of the viola-
tion of the ordinance, cannot be allowed. That 
rule, like the rule requiring actual knowledge of 
peril, is too harsh to be consonant with justice. 
As stated in Yellow Cab Corporation v. !-lender-
son, supra (178 Va. 207, 16 S. E. 2nd 393): 'The 
antecedent negligence of a plaintiff does not of 
itself preclude his recovery. Starkly stated, the 
reason for the rule is this: One cannot kill another 
1nerely because he is negligent.' 
'• In other words, a drunken or speedy motor-
ist may not run down a careless pedestrian with 
impunity. 
"There is no difference in principle as to the 
effect of negligence whether arising by violation 
of an ordinance, or by ordinary negligence. In 
either instance, whether it is the remote or proxi-
nlate cause of an accident, is a question of fact 
in each particular case ... Although, as to the for-
mer, the negligence is presumed as a matter of 
law, yet whether it is the proximate cause of· an 
accident is always a matter of fact. Smith v. Zone 
Cabs, 135 Ohio St. 415, 21 N.E. 2d 336, 338. In 
that case, in which the violation of an ordinance 
was involved, the court said: 'However, the negli-
gence which the law attributes to appellant is not, 
in and of itself, sufficient to preclude his recovery. 
To operate as a bar, his negligence must be shown 
as a n1atter of fact to have had a causal relation 
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to and connection with his injuries. In other 
words, the negligence which the law here attri-
butes to appellant must be shown to have been the 
proximate cause of his injuries. Negligence per se 
and proximate cause are two separate and distinct 
issues. "\Vhile one is presumed as a matter of law, 
the other must nevertheless, be proved as a matter 
of fact. Although appellant crossed the street be-
tween intersections, in violation of an ordinance, 
he cannot be held as a matter of law to have rea-
sonably apprehended that in so doing injury would 
result. Even to a pedestrian, thus crossing, a 
motorist owes the duty of exercising ordinary 
care. It is true that such ordinance gives to a 
motorist the right of way between intersections. 
However, that right is not absolute but prefer-
ential only, and the motorist is not absolved from 
his duty of exercising ordinary care for the safety 
of pedestrians, rightfully or wrongfully on the 
highway between such intersections. Whether the 
cab driver in the instant case exercised such care 
was a question of fact for the jury.'" 
We have found three recent Kansas cases, namely, 
Baker vs. Western Casualty d!; Surety Co., 164 Kan. 376, 
190 Pac. 2nd 850, Atkins vs. illorton, 164 Kan. 626, 191 
Pac. 2nd 909, and Lawrence ~;:-;. Kansas Power & Light 
Co., (Supra), and in each of these cases the question of 
proximate cause was held to be a jury question. In a 
recent Colorado case, Amos vs. Remington Arms Co., 117 
Colo. 399, 188 Pac. 2nd 896, a directed verdict for the 
defendant was reversed on the ground that proximate 
cause was a question for the jury. In three recent cases 
decided by the California Appellate Court, namely, 
Douglas vs. Hoff, 82 Cal. App. (2d) 8:2, 185 Pac. 2nd 607, 
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and Green vs. Uarte, 87 Cal. App. (.2d) 7•j, 196 Pac. 2nd 
63 and Wiswell vs. Sh-inners (Supra), a directed verdict, 
a non-suit, and a directed verdict respectively, for the 
defendants involved were reversed and the question of 
proximate cause was held to be a question for the jury. 
To the same effect were the cases of Chavez vs. Worley, 
a New :Mexico case, found at 48 N. J.lf. 449, 152 Pac. 2nd 
393, and Carlson 'US. Whelan, a vVashington case, 197 
Wash. 104, 84 Pac. 2nd 1001. 
In the case of Genola vs. Barrett, 14 Cal. (2d) 217, 
93 Pac. 2nd 109, the Supreme Court of California, in a 
case involving a pedestrian and an aut01nobile where 
the pedestrian was crossing in violation of an ordinance, 
stated: 
"Not only did the trial court hold in the case 
at bar, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent, but that her negligence, was, 
per se, the proximate cause of her injury. Here, 
plaintiff was standing in the street, according to 
one eye-witness, about ten or twelve seconds. She 
then stepped back, at which tilne the car was not 
within an approximate eighty-foot range of vision 
of the witness. When defendant failed to see what 
was plainly visible, failed to slacken her speed, 
and failed to swerve her car a few inches to avoid 
striking plaintiff who had yielded the right of 
way, it cannot be said that, as a matter of law, the 
negligence of plaintiff was the proximate cause of 
her injury." 
And, in the case of Young vs. Boy Scouts of Amer-
ica, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 760, 51 Pac. 2nd 191, the Court said: 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Whether or not the 1ninor plaintiff, in riding 
his bicycle after dark without a light, was guilty 
of contributory negligence which was a proximate 
eause of his injuries was also a question of fact 
and not one of law." 
The case of JJlaier et al v. Minidoka County Motor 
Co., (Stttpra), involved a bicycle, with no headlight but 
with a rear reflector, that was struck from the rear at 
night by an automobile. The Supreme Court of Idaho 
held that the questions of negligence, contributory negli-
gence and proxi1nate cause were all properly for the 
jury. 
In Briggs vs. United Fruit & Produce Inc., 11 Wash. 
(2d) 466, 119 Pac. 2nd 687, a bicycle with both a headlight. 
and a reflector, was struck from behind at night by a 
truck, and there it was contended that the bicycle was 
near the center of the road rather than on the side. The 
Court held that contributory negligence and proximate 
cause were jury questions. 
And, in Pollard 'CS. Wittman, 28 Wash. (2d) 367,183 
Pac. 2nd 175, a ·n10torcycle without lights was involved 
in an accident with a n1otorist crossing into the wrong 
lane. The court held that the proximate cause of the 
accident should be submitted to the jury. 
The Supreme Court of California, 1n the case of 
llart v. Farris, 218 Cal. 69, 21 Pac. 2nd 432, at page 433, 
makes the following statement: 
"It was admitted that the bicycle carried no 
light at all. Appellants contend that such fact 
30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
establishes negligence per se upon the plaintiff's 
part barring recovery. A violation of the provi-
sions of the statute by plaintiff would not bar 
her fron1 recovery on the ground of contributory 
negligence unless such violation of law proxi-
mately contributed to the accident. • • • Pre-
sunlably the jury concluded that, in view of the 
lack of attention of the driver of the automobile 
to the road ahead and the good light which the 
headlights of the automobile reflected ahead for 
a distance of 300 feet, the absence of lights on 
the bicycle was not a contributing factor in the 
accident. Such was the. view of the trial court 
as expressed in denying appellants' motion for a 
new trial. Such a conclusion had mnple support 
in evidence." 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred 
m directing a verdict in favor of the respondent and 
against the appellants for the reasons that the presump-
tion of due care on the part of appellants' deceased was 
not overcome, and whether he was guilty of contributory 
negligence or not was a question for the jury as well as 
the question of proxinmte causation. The trial court 
inferred that said deceased either did not look or look-
ing, did not see what he should have seen. "\Ve contend 
that that is not the only reasonable inference that can 
be drawn. It is just as reasonable to infer that he looked 
and saw and n1isjudged the distance and speed of the 
taxicab. It is also a perfectly proper inference that the 
deceased entered the intersection long before the taxicab 
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was in view, and for Home reaHon \\'as still in the inter-
~eetion when the taxicab Htruck hilu. vVe Inaintain that 
the reasonable inferences that can he drawn from the 
facts of this caHe regarding causation are not plain, con-
~i~tent and uncontradictory, but, on the contrary are 
inconsistent and contradictory, and upon proper instruc-
tion becmne i:-;sues of fact that could only be decided by 
the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HEBER GRANT IVINS, 
ROBER'r B. PORTER, JR., 
DELBERT ~I. DRAPER, Jr., 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
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